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Bank's Right of Setoff in Latin American Countries
by Lewis M. Smoley*
I. INTRODUCTION
MERGING FROM THE complexity and confusion surrounding the
Iranian crisis and its effect upon the banking and financial communi-
ties both in the United States and abroad, several significant legal issues
striking at the very heart of business and industry have had severe im-
pact upon traditional business considerations and practices. The advent
of U.S. Foreign Assets Control Act (FACO) regulations freezing Iranian
assets brought to an immediate standstill almost all trade and banking
transactions between the United States and Iran.1 In many instances af-
fected transactions were halted in mid-stream without adequate means of
preventing severe inequities to U.S. companies as well as Iranian nation-
als. In the banking industry, FACO regulations appeared to prohibit
bank-creditors from attaching and offsetting Iranian funds which they
held against Iranian indebtedness.' Notwithstanding these regulatory re-
straints, some U.S. banks and their foreign branches and subsidiaries at-
tempted to offset frozen Iranian assets (or took other action which
amounts to doing so), thus embroiling the banking community in a major
controversy over the effect and applicability of these regulations both at
home and abroad as they relate to a bank's traditional right of setoff.
From the surfeit of lawsuits and controversies which relate to the
setoff issue, there appears to have emerged a serious concern on the part
of bankers in the United States as to whether they can rely upon the
* Counsel to American Express International Banking Corporation. B.A., Queens Col-
lege (1965) (Philosophy major); J.D., New York University School of Law (1968). Member of
the Bars of the State of New York and Washington, D.C. Member of the Banking Commit-
ties of the Bar Association of the City of New York and the International Chamber of
Commerce.
I Foreign Assets Control Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706, Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§
535.201-203 (1979). See also, Exec. Order No. 12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979).
' According to the Foreign Control Act Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 525.201(a) (1979): "No
property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or which is in the possession or
control of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" in which an Iranian
entity has "any interest of any nature whatsoever may be transferred, paid, . . . withdrawn
or otherwise dealt in except as authorized . . . ." A subsequent amendment, however, con-
tained in 31 C.F.R. § 535.902 (issued Nov. 16, 1979) authorized foreign branches and subsid-
iaries of U.S. entities to offset funds held by them outside the United States against Iranian
indebtedness.
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right of setoff in regard to deposits held by their banks in foreign offices.
Considerations prompting major policy decisions concerning asset and lia-
bility management of international banking institutions now appear to
include a more serious discussion of, if not investigation into the availa-
bility of, setoff as a legal right and a practical mechanism for recovery of
matured indebtedness. Consequently, it appears appropriate to examine
the right of setoff as it applies in Latin American countries which in re-
cent years have become significant borrowers in the Eurodollar market as
well as receptive localities for the establishment of branches and subsidi-
aries of large U.S. banks. Six major Latin American borrowers (i.e., Ar-
gentina, Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela) raised over $24 bil-
lion from the Eurobank credit market during 1979, an amount which is
almost 33 percent of all syndicated credits negotiated in that year.3 The
ability of these major Latin American countries to service such a heavy
indebtedness, however, will depend immeasurably upon their correspond-
ing ability to bring inflation under control, take corrective measures to
adjust the imbalance of payments and trade, increase productivity, build
up a viable and dependable work force and internal industry, and service
the needs of growing populations. Perhaps the battle-hardened capital
markets can recycle enough money to tide over the deficit countries, both
rich and poor. Private bankers, however, continue to warn that the inter-
national banking system is over-stretched. Fear of rising instability in
countries which are large borrowers, such as Iran and Korea, produces an
increasing paranoia which has a telling effect upon future credit determi-
nations. With Latin America's history of political instability, only dis-
sipating within the past decade or two in some of the major countries,
high level Latin American borrowers may find that requests for funding
of future financial needs arising both from the desire to finance major
government projects as well as the probability of cash flow impediments
resulting in the necessity of rollover loans, may be met with less positive
responses than banks have given in the past. To understand the impact of
the Iranian crisis and its potential effect on Latin American borrowers, it
is important to highlight the chain of events which precipitated questions
regarding the efficacy of the right of setoff.
II. EVENTS CAUSING CONCERN AS TO THE, RIGHT OF SETOFF
Initially, the newly-installed revolutionary Government of Iran na-
tionalized local industry in general and Iranian banks in particular. This
3 See WORLD FINANCIAL MARKETS, March, 1980 at 16 et seq.; Country Risk Evaluation
1979, EUROMONEY, Feb., 1980, passim.
' The Law of Nationalization of Banks, dated 17. 3. 1358 (June 7, 1979); The Law of
Nationalization of Insurance Corporations, dated 4. 3. 1358 (June 25, 1979); The Law for the
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resulted in serious concern on the part of many U.S. banks as to whether
the outstanding Iranian debts would be repaid. This concern reached cri-
sis proportions when many nationalized Iranian companies began to
openly repudiate foreign debt to U.S. banks - even repayment of Iranian
interbank indebtedness became uncertain. When Iranian officials began
to drop hints about withdrawing their U.S. dollar deposits, President
Carter froze Iranian assets in the United States and attempted to apply
this freeze to U.S. banks operating abroad.' Under the FACO regulations,
Iranian depositors would be prohibited from withdrawing their funds, but
so would bank creditors, who were in many cases continuing to fund past
due credits while they had sufficient funds on deposit to liquidate out-
standing obligations. Major U.S. banks appeared to be least at risk since
most of the approximately $8 billion of Iranian deposits in the U.S. were
placed with them. Ironically, the first protective steps were taken by the
major New York banks. Although international interbank debt has tradi-
tionally been considered inviolate, many U.S. banks feared that regard-
less of the resolution of the political crisis, Iranian banks might make
massive withdrawals once the freeze was lifted. Contrary to the general
aversion among banks against suing each other, several major U.S. banks
began to move against Iranian bank debtors (as well as government and
private sector debtors) in the courts here and abroad. Rumors spread that
some U.S. banks were offsetting Iranian deposits, notwithstanding the
freeze.7 Fearing the loss of these deposits, other banks began instituting
suit in an effort to place a subordinate block on Iranian deposits which
would have the effect of inhibiting withdrawals if and when the freeze
was lifted. Although Treasury Department regulations appear to prohibit
entry of any judgment or of any decree or order,' two major United States
banks were able to obtain prejudgment orders of attachment against Ira-
nian deposits.' As a consequence, a few days thereafter the Treasury De-
partment revised its regulations to allow such attachments.10 The flood of
subsequent litigation threatened to deluge as well as muddy the waters of
Protection and Development of Iranian Industry, dated 14. 1. 1358 (July 5, 1979).
Kifner, Iranian Now Calls Foreign Debts Void But Exempts Some, N.Y. Times, Nov.
24, 1979, at 1, col. 1; Hershey, Banking World Puzzled Over Iran's Stand on Debt, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 24, 1979 at 29-30, col. 1.
' Exec. Order 12170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1979).
7Reports were widely circulated during the early stages of the crisis that Citibank and
Chase Manhattan Bank had, in fact, offset much of the Iranian funds then held on deposit.
* Foreign Assets Control Act Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 535.504(b) (1) (1979).
* Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. The State of Iran (Islamic Republic of
Iran), 70 Civ. 6312 (1979); European American Banking Corp. v. Bank Barzargani Iran, 79
Civ. 6316 (1979).
o Foreign Assets Control Act Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 535.504(d) (1979) was reinter-
preted to allow pre-judgment attachment without authorizing execution on property under
31 C.F.R. § 535.418 (1979).
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all future international interbank relationships. Strong adverse reaction
followed from European bankers who criticized the attempt by U.S. regu-
lators to apply the Iranian freeze on an extra-territorial basis." Although
the Treasury Department subsequently exempted from the freeze Iranian
deposits held in foreign currencies by U.S. banks abroad,1 2 the Eurodollar
market was severely shaken by both the applicability of the freeze and
the litigation commenced by Iranian banks in an effort to have it declared
illegal. These chaotic circumstances were not without profound conse-
quences for international banks, especially as they related to the issue of
lending to lesser developed countries (LDC's), such as those in Latin
America. New strategies are being considered by several U.S. banks to
promote a better asset/liability balance for a given country on the as-
sumption that deposit liabilities will be used to offset outstanding indebt-
edness. The revolution in Nicaragua and the major revision of interna-
tional country debt in Peru have served to fan the fires of concern
originally ignited by the Iranian crisis.
Although traditionally recognized and regarded as a virtually inalien-
able right, setoff as a legally viable practice has come under closer scru-
tiny. Some of the underlying reasons for concern over its availability re-
late to the historical perspective in which the right of setoff has
developed. While traditionally recognized at common law in most nations
which have a reasonably sophisticated banking system and participate in
international financial transactions, the right of setoff as it applies to
banks has only in rare instances been codified in statutory law. Many
Western European countries have implicitly acknowledged the right of
setoff more in the breach than in the honor of it. The lack of widespread
uniformity of law on this subject rarely caused concern, but the often se-
verely cautious approach of U.S. banks regarding legal protection of their
assets has resulted in serious concern over the adequacy of setoff as a
common law right.
Notwithstanding the apparant lack of significant written law on set-
off, general principles have developed upon which the right is most often
predicted. These principles are discussed below.
" Geddes, Europeans in Rift with U.S. Banks, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1979, at 1, col. 1;
Porter, London Report: Manner in Which U.S. Handled Freeze of Iranian Assets Angers
Foreign Banks, J. COM., Dec. 5, 1979, at 30; Iran Freeze and British Wrath, Financial
Times (London), Dec. 10, 1979, at 1, col. 1; Luhomski, German Bankers Disturbed, J. COM.,
Dec. 10, 1979, at 24; A Banking Rift Over Iran's Assets, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 10, 1979, at 30-31.
Is Foreign Assets Control Act Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 535.566 (1979).
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III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE RIGHT OF SETOFF
A. Mutuality
1. The Debtor-Depositor
The creditor (depositor) and the debtor must be one and the same
entity (i.e., in mutuality). Only funds (deposits) held in the name of or for
the benefit of the debtor itself may be offset.18 Consequently, the deposits
of Company X could not be offset against the indebtedness of Company
X's wholly-owned subsidiary unless Company X had so agreed in advance
(i.e., by guaranty or hypothecation). During the initial phase of the Ira-
nian crisis, several U.S. banks sought to offset deposits of Iranian govern-
ment entities against indebtedness of private Iranian companies on the
theory that the mutuality test was satisfied by reason of the nationaliza-
tion of these formerly private-company debtors. The question whether a
government's assets can be offset in satisfaction of the debts of companies
nationalized by that government is without precedent in the United
States. The success or failure of this argument (which has yet to be finally
determined) will depend in part upon the manner in which Iranian com-
panies had been nationalized. Mere acquisition of the shares of an Iranian
Company by the government as a method of nationalization may, argu-
endo, result in limited liability of the government as a shareholder. Con-
versely, if the Iranian government seized the assets and literally took con-
trol of the operations of the company such that the company no longer
had an independent status, it may be argued that the company debts
would have been implicitly assumed by the government in the act of na-
tionalization. In the event these issues should have to be decided by a
court of law, any such decision would certainly have a monumental effect
upon international aspects of a bank's right of setoff.
2. The Bank As Creditor-Depository
The same banking institution must hold both the debt and the de-
posit to be offset against it.14 This rule should also apply to bank subsidi-
aries. Therefore, a subsidiary of a U.S. bank located in a Latin American
country could not offset deposits held by it against the indebtedness of its
depositor with the bank's U.S. parent. While it is generally recognized in
the United States (under applicable state law) that a branch may offset
deposits held by it against the indebtedness of the depositor with a sister
branch in that state (the theory being that branches are all part of the
same legal entity for this purpose), it is uncertain whether the same ap-
i 10 AM. JUR. 2D, Banks §§ 666-683 (1963).
14 Id.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
plies to foreign branches, especially on a cross-border basis.1' To over-
come this problem, banks sometimes transfer outstanding indebtedness
to a branch, subsidiary or affiliate holding a deposit of the debtor so as to
satisfy this aspect of the mutuality test.18 While there appears to be no
specific prohibition against such a transfer of indebtedness (by reason of
sale, assignment, participation or otherwise), the same procedure may not
be available with respect to the transfer of deposits. Banking practice
does not condone transfer of deposits, especially if intended as a means of
effectuating recovery of debt, without the depositor's consent. During the
Iranian crisis, several banks attempted to effectuate transfers of indebt-
edness to branches or subsidiaries which held Iranian assets on deposit.
Some European central bankers reacted unfavorably to this action, possi-
bly in part resulting from their negative attitude toward the attempt by
the U.S. Treasury Department to apply FACO regulations to deposits
held in U.S. banks operating in their respective jurisdictions.
B. Enforceability
In order for the indebtedness to be subject to setoff, it must be in
such form as would render it enforceable against the debtor-depositor in
the country in which the deposit being offset is maintained. While most
international banking institutions lending to Latin American countries
seek opinion of legal counsel in the jurisdiction in which the borrower is
located to determine the enforceability of the indebtedness in that juris-
diction, the assets of the borrower may be located in several jurisdictions
rendering a predetermination of enforceability of indebtedness extremely
difficult. This risk, however, is somewhat diminished by the common
practice among government and large private-sector borrowers to main-
tain deposits in banks located in major international financial centers
where enforceability may not be a serious problem.
C. Conditionality
In order to effectuate setoff, there must be no conditions or other
impediments (legal or contractual) applicable to either the deposit or the
indebtedness against which the deposit is being offset. Therefore, bank
accounts held in the name of the debtor but specifically designated as "in
' Furthermore, the dual banking system in the United States that has to date pre-
vented interstate branching virtually eliminates any possibility of a determination of the
setoff questions on an interstate basis.
16 The problem may be one of timing. First, the transfer must be made and (as noted
below) the debt must have matured prior to setoff. If the deposit involved is unencumbered
and held on demand, it may be withdrawn by the depositor (or attached by another credi-
tor) before setoff can be accomplished.
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trust for" another person, for the beneficial interest of another or held in
some other limited capacity with regard to ownership and control over
the deposit would not be available for setoff. In some instances, contrac-
tual obligations or restrictions may limit the right of setoff even if the
relevant contract relates to third parties. For example, banks participat-
ing in a syndicated term loan transaction may be required by the terms of
the related loan agreement to share with the other bank participants any
deposits of the borrower offset against indebtedness of that borrower in-
curred in the applicable transaction. Legal impediments to setoff may in-
volve statutory or other liens which have priority over or restrictions im-
posed by law on setoff (i.e., in bankruptcy). 17
D. Payable in Kind
The credit and the debt involved in a setoff must both be payable in
the same kind (i.e., in money). It is uncertain as to whether a bank's right
of offset is limited to deposits or whether it can be extended to negotiable
securities or other property held by the bank in a capacity other than as a
depository institution. Some Latin American, countries (e.g., Argentina)
have specific rules relating to setoff against negotiable instruments paya-
ble to bearer."8
E. Maturity
Generally, a bank's right of setoff does not arise until the obligations
of the depositor to the bank have matured. It appears that no such limi-
tation relates to the deposit itself'(i.e., where such deposit is held on a
time basis, it still may be offset against a matured debt of the depositor).
IV. CURRENT STATUS OF-THE LAW OF.SETOFF IN LATIN AMERICA
In an effort to determine the viability and applicability of the tradi-
tional bank's right of setoff in Latin America, we surveyed the current
status of applicable law in nine representative Latin American countries:
Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama
and Venezuela. Each of these countries was chosen by reason of its strong
participation in the international financial market either as a borrower or
host country for branches or subsidiaries of U.S. banking institutions. In
most jurisdictions which recognize a bank's right of setoff in one form or
17 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1978), which recognizes setoff
for pre-petition claims but limits the amount available for setoff so that a creditor may not
enhance its position during the 90-day preference period.
's A debtor cannot setoff against a legitimate bearer by negotiable instruments by en-
dorsement unless he is a creditor of such bearer. Art. 819 C6digo Civil (Argen.).
1981
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another, the legal basis for asserting such right is derived more often from
business custom and practice or generic principles of commercial or civil
law than from specific statutory or regulatory authority. In only three of
the countries investigated could we cite references to codified law on the
subject specifically pertaining to banks. In Bolivia, Article 1350 of the
Commercial Code contains specific authority for a bank to debit the
checking account of its customer for amounts which represent past due
obligations of that customer to the bank, provided that joint accounts
may not be offset unless all the account holders are liable for such obliga-
tions.19 Setoff is similarly permitted by statute in Argentina20 under the
particular conditions that the offsetting credits and debits be reciprocal
and enforceable at the same time. Colombian law also recognizes the
banker's right of setoff with the proviso that such right can be limited or
denied by agreement of the bank and its customer.21 Opinions issued by
the Superintendent of Banks in Colombia have substantiated the right
while prohibiting its application to government-owned deposits.22
The remaining Latin American nations surveyed recognize an histori-
cal legal principle referred to as "la compensacion", upon which the right
of setoff is propounded. According to this juridical concept as most suc-
cinctly stated in the Civil Law of the Republic of Ecuador, "if two per-
sons are debtors one to the other, between them would be a compensation
which extinguishes both debts".2  A related section of the Ecuadorian
Civil Law, however, provides that "the depository cannot without consent
of the depositor, withhold the item deposited, either as a compensation or
as security for what the depositor owes . . ." with certain exceptions
which relate primarily to goods not including money (e.g., the depositor's
account may be debited for losses or expenses incurred in maintenance of
the account, such as service charges). Under Venezuelan law, a compensa-
tion exists under similar circumstances without express declaration and
even without knowledge of the debtor, but only for indebtedness in
money or a determined amount of goods which can be substituted one for
the other and are both liquid and matured.25 Statutory law codifying the
concept of "la compensacion" may also be found in Brazil" and
Colombia.2 7
" Art. 1350 C6digo De Comercio (Bol.).
20 Art. 818 C6digo Civil (Argen.) includes a reference to both national and foreign
banks as authorized to effectuate setoff.
21 Art. 1385 C6digo De Comercio (Colom.).
22 Opinion of the Banking Superintendant of Colombia (May 28, 1975).
22 Art. 1698 C6digo Civil (Ecuador).
11 Id. art. 2166.
25 Arts. 133-1333 C6digo Civil (Venez.).
20 Art. 900 C6digo Civil (Braz.).
27 Art. 1.714 C6digo Civil (Colom.).
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A related theory which has received some acceptance in Venezuela as
a basis for asserting a right of setoff is referred to as "derecho de reten-
cion" or the "right of retention". Under this legal doctrine, a creditor may
retain goods in its possession belonging to a debtor who has shown reluc-
tance to repay his indebtedness or perform any other contractual obliga-
tion.2 8 The right of retention applies even where ownership of the partic-
ular personalty or securities in the creditor's possession has been
transferred by the debtor to a third party who has no knowledge of the
debt. By analogy, under this theory, a bank in Venezuela should be
within its rights in refusing to honor a check drawn on an account which
has been either offset or blocked because of failure of the depositor to
repay his indebtedness to the bank. Is it advisable, however, for the bank
to notify the depositor of any such action with regard to his account so as
to prevent any unnecessary loss or damage to the customer or his reputa-
tion which may result from his assumption that funds remain available in
the account against which he can continue to draw drafts? Failure to so
notify the depositor may result in potential liability of the bank for such
loss or damage. Since the right of retention is subject to contract princi-
ples, it would not apply if incompatible with the terms of an agreement
between the parties, specific instructions of the debtor or a direction ac-
cepted by the creditor to dedicate the assets to a particular use. Further-
more, the debtor may prevent the exercise of the right of retention by
furnishing the creditor with a collateralized guaranty. Contrary to general
principles of setoff, the right of retention may even be exercised with re-
gard to unmatured debts (1) when the debtor is bankrupt or insolvent, or
(2) when execution against the debtor has been unsuccessful.1s
Further derivative sources of the right of setoff may be found in gen-
eral commercial or banking law provisions. For example, Article 613 of
the Chilean Commercial Code states that the final closing of current ac-
counts unalterably fixes the status of the parties' legal relation and pro-
duces by operation of law a setoff which is predicted upon offsetting deb-
its and credits.80 Article 1662 of the Chilean Code, however appears to
prohibit setoff where a claim is made by a depositor for repayment of his
deposit."1 The banking community in Chile follows the General Condi-
8 Art. 123 C6digo De Comercio (Venez.).
2' The Venezuelan Commercial Code. provides that "instructions of the debtor to the
creditor, or directions accepted by the latter to use the articles or securities for a determined
purpose, do not militate against the right of retention in those cases where the creditor was
unaware until after delivery of the articles or securities or the acceptance of the instructions
of any of the events described in (1) and (2) above." Art. 123 C6digo De Commercio
(Venez.).
no Art. 613 C6digo De Comercio (Chile).
Local legal practice in Chile seems to favor application of Article 613 as the gov-
erning rule of law since it applies specifically to current accounts. By implication, setoff of
1981
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tions for Current Bank Accounts which is approved by the Banking Su-
perintendent and contains established rules prescribing the conduct of
banking operations. These rules authorize setoff of a customer's current
account in respect of any type of debt the customer may have with the
bank depository, whether for expenses, discounted documents remaining
unpaid or extensions of credit. Generally, Chilean banks debit to current
accounts the value of documents or commercial instruments which they
have discounted for their customers and which are protested at maturity
for non-payment by the acceptor or drawee. The Chilean Banking Super-
intendant has instructed banks under his aegis not to effect such debits
unless the following conditions are fulfilled:
(1) the current account has sufficient disposable funds;
(2) the bank's customer has been given express written notice of, and
has consented to, the debit being made; and
(3) the debit is made no earlier than two days after the customer has
been notified that the account is to be debited, so that he can have the
opportunity to note the debit on his account records.
Similar principles are applicable in Venezuela. Under Article 503 of
the Venezuelan Code of Commerce:
a current account is a contract in which one of the parties deposits with
the other or receives from the latter, title to amounts of money or other
valuables without being destined to a particular use or without any obli-
gation to hold a particular valuable or its equivalent value to the order of
the former, but rather to credit the depositor for his deposits liquidating
same through payments at the periods agreed upon up to the current
amount of the respective deposits on the basis of the aggregate of debits
and credits and to pay over any balance (italics mine).8
This language is usually interpreted to allow the aggregate of all such
debits and credits to be so applied, thus effecting setoff by operation of
the account. This underlying theory of current accounts is generally ac-
knowledged to apply to bank accounts as well as mercantile accounts.
Regardless of the merits of derivative legal arguments regarding
bank's right of setoff, most of the Latin American countries surveyed
have adopted a cautious approach relying on general contract principles
where no specific prohibition exists. It is common banking practice in
these countries to obtain a specific written authorization for setoff from
the customer as part of the account documentation. In Mexico, which has
a statutory prohibition against setoff of deposits,88 and in Panama, which
time deposits may not be enforceable unless and until they mature (thereby becoming de-
mand or current deposits).
" Art. 503 C6digo De Comercio (Venez.).
" Art. 2185 C6digo Civil (Mex.). It is unclear, however, whether this general prohibi-
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is silent on the issue, application of this practice is most important. Con-
versely, in Venezuela, Article 525 of the Code of Commerce is interpreted
to permit setoff as a consequence of its permissive attitude toward the
parties to a banking transaction establishing the juridical relations be-
tween them unless limited by particular statutory law or regulation.
In addition to the conditions and limitations referred to above, setoff
may be restricted by foreign exchange control and bankruptcy laws. Re-
garding the former, Brazilian law prohibits setoff of foreign currency de-
posits of local residents against foreign indebtedness without the express
authorization of the Central Bank. This restriction applies by virtue of
the government's control of remittances abroad in foreign currency. With
regard to bankruptcy, some of the Latin American jurisdictions surveyed
prohibit exercise of the right to setoff after the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy, 4 while others limit the amount which can be setoff under
such circumstances to pre-petition indebtedness.35
V. CONCLUSION
This brief analysis of local law in nine Latin American countries indi-
cates both the dearth of concrete law on the subject of setoff and the
diversity of legal theories upon which its practice is based. Although
emergence of these nations as significant participants in the international
financial, market is relatively recent, the conduct of banking operations
therein as it relates to setoff is generally predicted upon time-honored
principles of banking applicable in most Western nations. All the jurisdic-
tions surveyed in one form or another recognize or at least tolerate the
principle of a bank's right of setoff. Furthermore, while subject to differ-
ing rules and restrictions on its application, the right of setoff seems to
have a legal status in the Latin American countries similar to other major
Western nations. While U.S. banks operating in these Latin American ju-
risdictions may take some comfort in their reliance on setoff from its gen-
eral acceptance in these countries, fallout engendered from the recent Ira-
nian crisis has caused speculation that setoff may not be as inviolable a
right as traditionally presumed. Concern over balancing bank assets and
liabilities on a country-by-country basis will have an immeasurable effect
upon cross-border risk analysis of potential Latin American borrowers.
Efforts will undoubtedly be made to shore up the legal adequacy of setoff
in banking practice - for example, by including specific authority there-
for in loan and deposit account documentation. Resistance from borrow-
tion applies to commercial deposits. In any event, it appears that rights granted under this
Article may be waived by a specific authorization from the customer.
34 See, e.g., Art. 1350 C6digo De Comercio (Bol.).
" Art. 134 C6digo Civil (Argen.).
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ers on this issue appears likely. Clarification of the setoff question -
whether by specific statute or judicial decision - may become imperative
as reliance on this common practice becomes increasingly dubious. The
time has come for custom to be translated into clear, precise and worka-
ble law.
